I wouldn't say that he was bending over backwards, but come on! You didn't really think the the guy had WMD's did ya? Did we not send in Hans Blix who said he couldn't find any? Hopefully, you're not ignorant enough to still believe that there are WMD's in Iraq when our military has been all over the country.
Sure, Saddam could have avoided all of this by letting the inspectors a free run of this place in the '90's, but the fact remains that the last inspections in 2002 showed that there was no Iraqi WMD threat to the USA. I never said Saddam "was bending over backwards to comply". I stated that he "went out of his way." It should be obvious to even the most casual observer that GWB invade Iraq for reasons only he knows.
As for proving Saddam had destroyed the WMD after the first Gulf war, they didn't keep any records because the Iraqi army was in such poor shape.
As far as the $25k in the West Bank thing is concerned, one either thinks it as life insuranace money for noble freedom fighters or as cash to recruit terrorists with a very strong death wish... What do you know of prices of things in the West Bank?
It is clear that Bush invaded Iraq because he relied too heavily on advisors who had a known agenda against Hussein. Frontline did a story on this in early 2002 (either just before or just after the invasion began). There was an organization (can't remember the name) committed to lobbying for the overthrow of Hussein. They met with anybody who would give them an audience (including Clinton a time or two) with petitions from many conservative foreign policy and defense wonks calling for decisive action against the dictator. Both Cheney and Rumsfeld were charter members.
I'm also guessing that since Powell is typically blamed for swaying his father from finishing off the Republican Guard units before they withdrew to Baghdad, I'd imagine that this diminished the input he had in the process.
I'm sure they could have mustered up a video camera to film the destruction of the materials. I mean honestly, how likely is it that they would go to all the trouble to actually comply with the UN and not keep any documentary or artifactual evidence of the destruction process?As for proving Saddam had destroyed the WMD after the first Gulf war, they didn't keep any records because the Iraqi army was in such poor shape.
I could tell you, but I'd have to kill you. :icon_wink:As far as the $25k in the West Bank thing is concerned, one either thinks it as life insuranace money for noble freedom fighters or as cash to recruit terrorists with a very strong death wish... What do you know of prices of things in the West Bank?
Here is one link that has some general stuff on Iraq's ties to terrorism, which according to the Senate's Intelligence Committee date back to the 1960s: http://www.cfr.org/publication/7702/
Here is a link to the IC's report on prewar intelligence. It mostly comments on methodology, but provides some consensus about a few of the prewar intelligence claims.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell...intell_toc.htm
Hans Blix's report to the UN Security Council, March 19, 2003:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/li...blix-intro.htm
Originally Posted by Hans Blix
Iraqi insurgents getting bolder...
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4 Troops Abducted, Killed in Iraq Attack
- By STEVEN R. HURST and QASSIM ABDUL-ZAHRA, Associated Press Writers
Saturday, January 27, 2007
(01-27) 03:24 PST BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) --
In perhaps the boldest and most sophisticated attack in four years of warfare, gunmen speaking English, wearing U.S. military uniforms and carrying American weapons abducted four U.S. soldiers last week at the provincial headquarters in the Shiite holy city of Karbala and then shot them to death.
The U.S. military confirmed a report earlier Friday by The Associated Press that three of the soldiers were dead and one was mortally wounded with a gunshot to the head when they were found in a neighboring province, about 25 miles from the compound where they were captured. A fifth soldier was killed in the initial attack on the compound.
The new account contradicted a U.S. military statement on Jan. 20, the day of the raid on an Iraqi governor's office, that five soldiers were killed "repelling" the attack.
The security breakdown and the dramatic kidnapping and murder of four soldiers leaked out just as President Bush faces stiffening congressional opposition over his plan to flood Baghdad and surrounding regions with 21,500 more American troops. Two of Congress's most vocal war critics, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Rep. John Murtha, were in the Iraqi capital as the news broke.
In a statement issued late Friday, the military said two of the soldiers were handcuffed together in the back seat of an SUV near the southern Iraqi town of Mahawil. A third dead soldier was on the ground nearby. The fourth soldier died on the way to the hospital.
The brazen assault, 50 miles south of Baghdad, was conducted by nine to 12 gunmen posing as an American security team, the military confirmed. The attackers traveled in black GMC Suburban vehicles (the type used by U.S. government convoys), had American weapons, wore new U.S. military combat fatigues, and spoke English, according to two senior U.S. military officials as well as Iraqi officials.
None of the American or Iraqi officials would allow use of their names because of the sensitive nature of the information.
The confirmation came after nearly a week of inquiries. The U.S. military in Baghdad initially did not respond to repeated requests for comment on reports that began emerging from Iraqi government and military officials on the abduction and a major breakdown in security at the Karbala site.
Within hours of the AP report that four of the five dead soldiers had been abducted and found dead or dying about 25 miles east of Karbala, the military issued a long account of what took place.
"The precision of the attack, the equipment used and the possible use of explosives to destroy the military vehicles in the compound suggests that the attack was well rehearsed prior to execution," said Lt. Col. Scott Bleichwehl, spokesman for Multi-National Division-Baghdad.
"The attackers went straight to where Americans were located in the provincial government facility, bypassing the Iraqi police in the compound," he said. "We are looking at all the evidence to determine who or what was responsible for the breakdown in security at the compound and the perpetration of the assault."
The Karbala raid, as explained by the Iraqi and American officials, began after nightfall on Jan. 20, while American military officers were meeting with their Iraqi counterparts on the main floor of the Provisional Joint Coordination Center in Karbala.
Iraqi officials said the approaching convoy of black GMC Suburbans was waved through an Iraqi checkpoint at the edge of the city. The Iraqi soldiers believed it to be American because of the type of vehicles, the distinctive camouflage American uniforms and the fact that they spoke English. One Iraqi official said the leader of the assault team was blond, but no other official confirmed that.
A top Iraqi security official for Karbala province told the AP that the Iraqi guards at the checkpoint radioed ahead to the governor's compound to alert their compatriots that the convoy was on its way.
Iraqi officials said the attackers' convoy divided upon arrival, with some vehicles parking at the back of the main building where the meeting was taking place, and others parking in front.
The attackers threw a grenade and opened fire with automatic rifles as they grabbed two soldiers inside the compound. Then the guerrilla assault team jumped on top of an armored U.S. Humvee and captured two more soldiers, the U.S. military officials said.
In its statement, the U.S. military said one soldier was killed and three were wounded by a "hand grenade thrown into the center's main office which contains the provincial police chief's office on an upper floor."
The attackers captured four soldiers and fled with them and the computer east toward Mahawil in Babil province, crossing the Euphrates River, the U.S. military officials said.
The Iraqi officials said the four were captured alive and shot just before the vehicles were abandoned.
Police, who became suspicious when the convoy of attackers and their American captives did not stop at a roadblock, chased the vehicles and found the bodies, the gear and the abandoned SUVs.
The military statement said: "Two soldiers were found handcuffed together in the back of one of the SUVs. Both had suffered gunshot wounds and were dead. A third soldier was found shot and dead on the ground. Nearby, the fourth soldier was still alive, despite a gunshot wound to the head."
The wounded soldier was rushed to the hospital by Iraqi police but died on the way, the military said.
The military also said Iraqi police had found five SUVs, U.S. Army-type combat uniforms, boots, radios and a non-U.S. made rifle at the scene.
Three days after the killings, the U.S. military in Baghdad announced the arrest of four suspects in the attack and said they were detained on a tip from a Karbala resident. No further information was released about the suspects.
Friday's military statement referred to the attackers as "insurgents," which usually suggests Sunnis. Although Karbala province is predominantly Shiite, Babil province is heavily populated by Sunnis in the north, near Baghdad. Babil's central and southern regions are largely Shiite.
A senior Iraqi military official said the sophistication of the attack led him to believe it was the work of Iranian intelligence agents in conjunction with Iraq's Shiite Mahdi Army militia, which Iran funds, arms and trains.
Just is saying it would take more than 3.5 months to prove 100% that Iraq DOESN'T have WMD. However, after 3.5 months they were about 95% sure Iraq didn't have a WMD program. So we went to war because of a very small chance that Iraq had WMD when given more time the inspections would have showed what we now know: that Iraq didn't have any WMD when we invaded.
Why didn't we give the inspection process more time?
Brian, you remember this don't you?
"31 July 2002: Richard Butler tells a US Senate committee that Iraq stepped up the production of chemical and biological weapons after UN inspections ended - and might even be close to developing a nuclear bomb."
So mcuh for our "intelligence".
Brian, PM Blair as admitted publically that the Downing Street Memo is authentic.
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SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
And I ask the question: Would any of the posters defending Bush send their sons and daughters to this chaotic hell hole? It's easy to argue the war when you have nothing or no one at stake. It is also easy to argue just for the hell of it or for some pathetic green dot. However, when your child's life is on the line for no apparent cause, no one could make an argument for such nonsense. It took a while for the republicans in Congress to wake up, it looks like it's going to take a little longer for the ultra smart conservatives on this board to come out of their coma.
It's not the parents sending the kids to war. Like I said elsewhere, don't sign up if you don't want to go to war. Kids are on their own at 18 years old. They make their own decisions. If an 18 year old wants to sign up, that's on them. Don't sign up if you can't take the heat. The services are not about paying for your college degree. That's a nice incentive, but not the reason for joining. If you don't want your kid in such situations, do whatever you can to talk them out of joining.