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I agree that it is an argument worthy of discussion. The departments of philosophy at Oxford, Harvard, NYU, Rutgers (to name a few) agree that this paradox is worthy of discussion as well. But the best response I'm getting is "idiotic".Originally Posted by Guisslapp
You're right. I was being caustic and unconstructive. Here's my reply as I would respond in one of my classes. However, I'm in a hurry so I'm not proofreading for spelling.I agree that it is an argument worthy of discussion. The departments of philosophy at Oxford, Harvard, NYU, Rutgers (to name a few) agree that this paradox is worthy of discussion as well. But the best response I'm getting is "idiotic".
Application of Logic
Let's take an obviously moral decision and apply your logic. Dr. X has developed a cure for MS. It can be injected into teh fetus and guarantees that the person will never have to deal with that horrible disease. He's a lock for a Nobel prize ad will be a national hero.
Unfortunately, your logic doesn't come to that conclusion.
1) We are allowing people to be born witn MS.
2) This creates individuals we'll call Painful1, Painfil2, etc...
3) He releases the cure for MS.
4) This creates individuals healthy1, healthy2, etc...
5) Painfil1, Painful2 are eliminated.
The analogy isn't perfect, but it works well enough for me to think the logic is bogus, so let's move on to what the error is
The Error
The error was made when you assigned existence to both hypothetical groups of individuals and associated death with the elimination of those individuals.
The next error was in your analysis of the logic by only applying it to what I call an "action/inaction" decision. Had you applied this to what I call a "left/right" decision where action is mandated that would affect the lives of future individuals, any choice would lead to "killing" a future individual.
The Real Problem
The real problem is that you creatd logic to justify a decision rather than analyze a situation. That made you reach elementary (12 year old) errors that you spent more time typing on than thinking out.
You could have said:
"Changes we make won't outcome future generations, so it is immoral to impose restrictions"
"My moral compass is self-centered so I don't care"
However, what you said is undeniably wrong.
And that, my objectivist Bulldogs, is pwnage.
Finally, welcome to the debate! I don't pay attention to spelling, so no bother.
A few thoughts... First, why is this an obviously moral decision? I would argue that this is a moral decision if the doctor believes that it is in doctor's rational self-interest to do so. Why might it be? Perhaps he wants fame of curing a disease, perhaps he makes money, perhaps he values the happiness of others in his framework. I would not argue unequivocally that a cure for a disease is an obvious moral good, however. That is very loose terminology. That said...
I'm not sure that the analogy fits. A better example is this: You decided that you wanted to have a child, but you are poor. In the future (maybe several years from now), you believe that your financial situation will improve, allowing for you to better care for a child. So, in the interests of the child (without consideration for yourself), you choose to hold off in having the child. My argument would be that you are not in fact serving the interests of "the child." In fact, the child that you would have when you were poor is very different from the child that you have several years later. One might be a boy, one might be a girl. The child you are envisioning (as a particular) will never exist as a result of your decision. As such, "in the interests of the child" have no legitimate place in the moral framework that you use to make this decision.
In your example, the person is never eliminated. Once a person comes into a definitive existence, I would argue that even (minor) genetic treatments do not result in a different person. Sure, it represents a change to a person, but that is not at all the same thing.
I'll apply your example slightly differently -- let us say that the cure meant that both would-be parents would undergo treatment PRIOR to conception, which would eliminate the risk of having a baby with MS. In this case, I would argue that application of my reasoning is appropriate. The fact that you are preventing your child from having MS IS NOT a moral argument, if you are making it from the perspective of the would-be child. Why? The child will be DIFFERENT -- you have wiped out a would be person and would create a new one. Now, you might decide to do the treatment with the (moral) justification that YOU would prefer not to have a child with MS if you could do something prior to conception to avoid it. But to be clear, it is most certainly NOT in the interest of the child that you would have otherwise had.
For an obligation like this to be valid, it must be an actionable positive right. That is, an "obligation" would basically mean that the future generation has some sort of claim over the actions of present day individuals, such that suits could be filed, etc. There is no way to get around that an identity is necessary for this.
It is an "intent" based decision. You are right -- ANY action that you take with the intent of doing something for a future (unconceived) group will (likely) eliminate that group. "Action/inaction" is not an appropriate way to think about it.. I say that my reasoning means that a specific moral framework is invalid.
Actually, I've thought about this argument for a long time, and I have only recently applied it to the global warming discussion. I was not the originator of the concept, but I think that my application might be (somewhat) unique.
My argument does not (directly) lead to the conclusion that it is immoral to impose restrictions for the benefit of the future generations. It does lead to the conclusion that it CANNOT be MORAL BECAUSE it is for the benefit of future generations. Again, I am arguing that a specific moral framework is flawed. It does happen to be true that my moral framework is not affected by this flaw, because it is "self-centered." In other words, I do not place an obligation on myself for future generations -- it has no basis in my decision-making.
Again, I would point out that there is a big difference between self-interest and environmental destruction. As pointed out by MANY, for example, environmental stewardship tends to IMPROVE with private ownership -- this should tell you something.
Nice try. :icon_wink:
if i had any idea what that meant, i'm sure i would agree.
randerizer's argument truly is absurd.
his first flaw, in my opinion, is that he uses as the basis for his argument the assumption that we owe some future generation a debt, and then rebuts your argument against it with the classical objectivist "we don't owe them anything" argument.
but the major flaw in his initial argument is the fact that he refers to individuals in the future, that have yet to be, as specific individuals. since we cannot know what individuals will come to be, we cannot have any obligation to any future individual. we can, however, if we do not subscribe to an objectivist philosophy, owe a debt to a future generation that will no doubt come to be, whomever those individuals are that make up said generation.
I can only give knowledge, not wisdom.
Now you are being openly evasive in moral framework. "Moral obligation" implies a debt, positive right, what have you. There is simply no way around that. A debt does require specificity with regards to the debt-holder.
These are not flaws -- they are political/philosophical/economic facts. To say that those that do not subscribe to objectivist philosophy can owe a debt to some future generation that will be is not really a valid argument. In fact, my whole point is that YOUR moral framework is not consistent. So, yes, you can claim to owe a debt, but that doesn't change the fact that your claim is not valid. :icon_wink:
so, your argument is as duckbill said. why bother doing all the silly absurd illogical dancing and just say, "i'm an objectivist, so i think you are stupid for thinking you anyone anything." your argument did not support your claim, and was illogical. why does a debt require specificity? because you say so? because that is the only practical way to make a tangible debt collectable?
As I have said from my first post on the subject, my point is that it is not morally defensible that present individuals can owe an obligation to future generations. To claim that we owe a duty to some (fuzzily defined) future individuals just glosses over the fact that acting on that duty leads to those precise future individuals being deprived of their would-be existence.
Now you are getting somewhere. But also because as a decision-making calculus, a fuzzily-defined "future generations" is too ambiguous to allow weighting versus present generation issues in any cohesive moral framework.
that is exactly what is absurd. one person you cannot owe a debt to is a specific, yet to exist, future individual (as you are implicitly defining individuals). since no specific future individual can be identified, the only future people to whom you can owe a debt have to be more loosely defined.
so says you. you can make an argument for an objectivist morality, but you cannot use that morality to argue against a rival philosophy. you have demostrated no support for your argument apart from your opinion.
allow me to demostrate how one could owe a real debt to future individuals.
let us assume that you want to borrow a sum of money from me. we work out the following contract:
i agree to lend you x amount of money. you are to repay the money, plus y amount of interest, in lump sum in ten years' time. but the money is not to be paid to me, but to be split evenly among the residents of town z, however many there may be at the time of the payment.
once you agree to that contract, you owe a debt to future individuals, defined only as residents of town z.
Hey rand & gui: I really am sorry for being so abrasive in my earlier replies. It's been a rough day.
If you explicitly define a contract to be fuzzy with regards to future entities, yes this is true. What is missing then is some specific contract to clearly generalize these future generations with regards to environmental protections. It would still also be a moral paradox if you were to live in town z and defend a position that your future child is owed his cut of x amount of money, particularly if you take actions on that position.
Then you cannot owe a debt to future generations, PERIOD, in a framework without precisely defined terms! To operate with loosely defined terms is not philosophically operable, period.
Not really -- this is hardly an objectivist theory. In fact, the original proponents of these arguments would NOT support objectivist thought. Nonetheless, the argument stands on its own merits. It does suggest that we must rethink our framework of bioethics that places duties on the present for future generations. Objectivist logic is not necessarily the only answer - it is what I believe to be the obvious answer, but this is a problem that ultimately utilitarians, deontologists, etc., must deal with. You are still glossing over the problem. Frankly, all moral philosophies that discuss future generations have not properly considered the conundrum.
Yeah, it is no problem for me. I was somewhat pushy to put my argument forth, so I would understand some initial abrasiveness. :icon_wink:
there is no paradox there. the contract specifically states "residents at the time of payment." therefore, at the time that the debt is due, there is no ambiguity as to the recipients. just admit that your original argument ("the people you are saving the earth for won't exist") was absurd.
as for the environmental argument, i would say that such a contract is implicit in any coherent philosophy that regards other individuals as being of equal or greater importance than self. if one believes it to be fairly likely that there will be future generations, then one has the obligation not to make life more difficult for them, just as one has the same obligation to one's contemporaries.
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