|
|
Actually, nothing to do with global warming for me - too damn big.Originally Posted by randerizer
Well, I argue that there is no moral basis for placing value on the future lives of the nonliving. There might be other reasons not to drive a Ford F-350, but global warming is one of them.
How is there any basis for either argument if there is no future?
Fair enough -- if there is no future period, there probably is no basis for a decision. But I am referring to currently existing entities and future existing entities, a subtle but important difference.
Then why split those entities into different groups in of themselves? A future entity is still a future entity. Your impact on that entity is determined by what you do and don't do. But it doesn't change that entity from being if your counting the entity.
Actually it does change the to-be entity. We can't identify it precisely, but there should be little doubt that it is changed.
Let me recast this because I jumped the gun slightly in the whole discussion. I say that the only thing that can possibly matter is those that are living now. Daybreaker (or other) calls me selfish, and says that we should care about all the good little boys and girls that will not be given a fair shake in the future because of our actions today. -- these basic arguments were presented first, but I'm not sure if anyone caught that. "Groups" are higher level abstractions as a group of INDIVIDUALS, so speaking of a group of future generations is shorthand for "all the little boys and girls," etc.
My argument, then, follows. IF we care about those good little boys and girls, we should not seek to change our actions FOR THEIR SAKE. WHY? Because those good little boys and girls will never come to be. Sure, SOME boys and girls might -- but that is not the same thing, and to think otherwise, simply, is glossing over the issue. In objectivist speak (not to be exlusive), it is a fallacy of a stolen concept -- a higher level abstraction taken without the base of what is below it, leading to a confused moral position. If one is to take a position that the future people have PRESENT value, I see no way, without misidentifying the entity that you give value to, to NOT arrive at this point.
I don't know how to be clearer in pointing out the logical flaw that you guys are making here. It is a flaw caused by misidentification. Frankly, my point is that the whole "future generations" argument is one made to "tug at our hearts" to bring about a change. It's a political/social/normative statement, but it just doesn't have a base.
Here are some works of interest on this subject, btw:
Parfit, Derek (1984), Reasons and Persons.
Schwartz, Thomas (1978), “Obligations to Posterity,” in Sikora, R.I. and Barry, B. (eds.), Obligations to Future Generations.
D'Amato, Tony (1997), "A Foundation for Bioethics," in International Law Studies, Collected Papers, Volume 2.
Everything a person does as an individual, affects those around them directly or indirectly, as well as those in the future. I eat a candybar, throw the paper away in the trash can... The trash-person isn't there, does that mean he/she doesn't exist?
It is pretty simple. future generations isn't a myth, and we do hold some RESPONSIBILITY, not for moral reasons, to give those future generations, no matter who or what they are, an equal or better life to what we had. I can be selfish all I want, and am a lot of times. Doesn't mean I shouldn't plan for the future of my son or daughter right now... for all I know, I may never have children, still doesn't mean I shouldn't plan, because with my selfishness, also comes with wanting to see those I spawn our those that are part of me (family, friends, etc.) have better and do better than I did at life.
Not necessarily.
You're just changing terms and hoping to skirt the issue. Why do we have this responsibility? I don't think see that we (generically) do, and noone has supplied a substantive argument to validate your RESPONSIBILITY hypothesis.
I have supplied a framework by which we can evaluate effects on future progeny, vis-a-vis my counter-example to the MS question posed by Duckbill. I might say that "I would like to have children, but I would not like to have a child with MS (if I could avoid it pre-conception)." You might say "I would like to have a child that... is poor, etc." That is valid and gets us somewhere. It does NOT, however, carry with it a RESPONSIBILITY or an OBLIGATION for the SAKE of those future progeny. It is a RESPONSIBILITY to uphold YOUR value judgements, for YOUR SAKE. Get it?
I say it's a responsibility because you owe a debt for your life. You were given it, so your yourself, should give it to someone else. It's one thing to not be able to, and another to not do it for the sake of not doing it. It is only right to give someone a future at least on par with what you had.
I owe a debt for my life?
Yes.
Interesting, but I would hardly say so.
randerizer, your argument about changing the group you are supposedly obligated to has absolutely no validity, as my hypothetical demonstrated. you feel no obligation to save unknown people from certain destruction, but that is because of your particular philosophy, not because of some farcicle paradox. anyone who feels an obligation to preserve his fellow man can feel the same obligation to future generations without having to resolve any paradox.
i can owe no obligation to people who never come to exist. however, if it is my duty to prevent suffering as much as it is in my power to do, then i have that duty to all who come to exist, insomuch as my actions affect them.
if you somehow caused a woman to become sterile, your crime is against that woman, not her children -- she has no children and never will.
one more hypothetical. you have an envelope that is full of a large sum of money. also in that envelope is a virus that will infect the person that opens the envelope. the virus will have no adverse affect on an adult, but if a woman becomes infected, she will pass the virus on to her children upon conception, and the virus will kill her child within two years of birth. you have the option to send the envelope to a very poor young couple that is trying to have children, or to destroy it. would it be morally acceptable to send the envelope to the couple? receipt of the envelope would no doubt change the environmental circumstances of the conception of that couple's child, thus changing who that child will be. so by not sending the envelope, you cause the very child whose life you would save to never come to exist. by your "logic" there is no moral difference between sending the envelope and destroying it.
If that is your argument, it is not logically constructed. You should know better.
The fact that I feel no obligation to save unknown people means nothing. My whole point is that "if you feel an obligation for..., then this is a paradox that you must account for."
That is a fair point, but it doesn't get you very far in attacking my position. In fact, if you make this argument, the logical conclusion is that we should disregard obligations to all future progeny -- if our actions lead to extinction, in fact, those future people would never exist and are of no value to the discussion. Right?
You can, in fact, owe no obligation to people who never come to exist (I completely agree). You also can owe no obligation to CREATE people that would not have otherwise existed. But, IF you claim to owe a moral obligation to future generations, the ONLY way you can do this (without committing a fallacy involving false identification, e.g., groupspeak when you omit the PARTICULARS of the group) is to owe an obligation to the prospective individuals of the future generation.
The ONLY way to maintain this moral obligation is to improve the lives of the prospective INDIVIDUALS that comprise the group that is the future generations. However, there is no way around the fact that your actions will NOT improve the lives of any prospective INDIVIDUALS, but will only REPOPULATE the hypothetical list of individuals that comprise the group.
NO ACTION that you can take can reduce the suffering of ANY (unconceived) individual in the future. You are building an argument that, instead, you can reduce the (NET) suffering felt on the planet in the future, which makes your action moral. But how do you arrive at the fact that reducing suffering is valuable? Ultimately, I see that you are separating some abstract value (reducing suffering) from why you hold that value (reducing the suffering of INDIVIDUALS, who are the only entities capable of suffering in the first place).
Unless I disclosed the complete situation to the couple, I do not think it would be morally appropriate to do this. I am misleading them into thinking that they are getting something for free. In fact, if the couple seeks to have a child that lives beyond their years, and they value having a child that does that moreso than the money they received, you can see why that would be questionable. I would not find it morally questionable to disclose what they were up against... $1M in the envelope that could be theirs, but they would become infected by a virus that would basically make them incapable of raising a child beyond a certain age. It is their choice, not mine.
In truth, though, it should be recognized that the child that is born with the disease could not have been born any other way.
that may be your point, but it was not your argument.If that is your argument, it is not logically constructed. You should know better.
The fact that I feel no obligation to save unknown people means nothing. My whole point is that "if you feel an obligation for..., then this is a paradox that you must account for."
yes, the prospective individuals, whomever they may be.
this is the absurdity of your argument. it does not matter if the faces change -- if individuals will suffer as a result of my actions, it does not matter who those individuals are.
you are skirting the question. in my hypothetical, you only have two choices: send the envelope with the contents described, or destroy it. just as daybreaker has no choice in your abuse of the environment, the couple in the hypo have no choice. the choice is yours: cause a child to be born diseased, or allow a child to be born as it will without your interferance.
It was my argument. Other people's interpretation of my argument just got jumbled because it was something they had not heard before. I have, from the beginning, claimed that the argument in no way changes MY moral position.
Again, from the beginning, the construction of the argument went...
Randy - we have no obligation to future generations
DB2 - What? You are being selfish. Of course we have an obligation to those good little boys and girls.
Randy - proceed with the rest.
If I have already stated that we have no obligation to future generations, why would it be a paradox to me? Potential people change, but no potential people have value/rights until they are ACTUAL persons.
There is no possible way that your actions can reduce the suffering of any particular individuals of a future generation. I would argue that the potential people that WOULD HAVE been born would probably prefer whatever suffering they would face to not being born at all.
Sorry -- other than the argument that it is absurd, you've yet to make a point. But, I'll go further... IF the individuals that are born into the future suffer IN ANY WAY, they suffer in that way as a result of your actions. That is, precisely, they would not have suffered otherwise, as they would not have existed.
IF this is your position, then your ethical standards have no appropriate base.
Sure, but the basis of my decision does not have to be the fact that a child is born with or without my interference. I do not think I would send the envelope, because I would be being hiding part of the package. In the same sense, I would not take a broken computer, make it look nice and pretty on the outside, and try to sell it as a functional machine. It is dishonest, and by my standards of dealing with others, that is something I'm not prepared to do.
-----------------------
Bob, I will agree wholeheartedly that my argument is unconventional. I am surprised by your blatant disregard for sound reasoning on this issue, though. You have yet to present any sort of real argument against this. If you read text-books, most international law, environmental law, etc., theorists accept that this person-changing issue is valid. They just choose to ignore it.
Posting Permissions
Reply With Quote
